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Abstract
On January 14, 2010, four Hellfire missiles fired from an unmanned aerial vehicle (“drone”)
slammed into a compound in Pakistan’s South Waziristan region, killing ten people. Hakimul-
lah Mehsud, leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (“TTP”), was the reported target of the strike.
Already the eighth US drone attack in Pakistan in 2010, these strikes followed two consecutive
years of dramatically increased drone activity within Pakistan. Despite a high degree of media
and scholarly interest in the United States’ use of drones in Pakistan, little attention has focused
on whether the United States is engaged in an armed conflict in Pakistan, as defined and catego-
rized by international humanitarian law (“IHL”). Instead, most analyses consider the efficacy of
the campaign or the legality of the use of force and, in particular, the use of drones for so-called
targeted killings. The primary debate has centered on whether the United States is acting lawfully
in self-defense and presumes that the US drone campaign in Pakistan is an extension of either the
NATO campaign in Afghanistan or the broader US conflict with Al Qaeda. Those who argue that
the US drone attacks do not qualify as self-defense thus find that the United States is in violation
of the international law governing the resort to force (jus ad bellum), and add that Pakistan has
not specifically requested US support against militants within Pakistan. In contrast, some argue
that the US drone campaign is justifiable self-defense, but suggest that actions taken in self de-
fense by a state against a nonstate actor do not necessarily result in an armed conflict. Kenneth
Anderson, in particular, views the drone campaign through a lens of self-defense and sees each
drone strike as a discrete self-defense event. The report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial Killings addresses the parameters and definition of armed conflict in analyzing
the legality of the drone strikes, but does not reach a definitive conclusion regarding the existence
or nature of the conflict in Pakistan. However, it is unsatisfactory to simply dismiss each drone
strike as a discrete self-defense response—thus obviating the need to examine whether the United
States is in an armed conflict in Pakistan—without examining whether the whole of the campaign
might rise to the level of an armed conflict. The level of violence attending the drone campaign,
the increasing rate of drone strikes since 2008, the drone campaign’s focus on the TTP, and the
ongoing hostilities between Pakistan and the TTP all combine to make an assessment of the ex-
istence and nature of an armed conflict critical at this juncture. Moreover, the existence of armed
conflict triggers the application of international humanitarian law, otherwise known as the law of
armed conflict or the law of war. The law of armed conflict governs the conduct of both states and
individuals during armed conflict and seeks to minimize suffering in war by protecting persons
not participating in hostilities and by restricting the means and methods of warfare. This Article
examines whether the United States is engaged in an armed conflict—as defined by IHL—with
the TTP in Pakistan, and if so, explores the nature of that engagement. Part I provides background
information on the TTP and other militant groups; the development and current state of hostili-
ties between Pakistan and the TTP; and the US drone campaign in Pakistan, particularly against
targets linked to the TTP. Part II applies the legal framework of armed conflict to the situation in
Pakistan. After setting forth the definition and elements of armed conflict, this Part analyzes the
nature of the conflict between Pakistan and the TTP. Finally, Part III examines US involvement in
the conflict in Pakistan to assess whether it constitutes an intervention in an ongoing conflict or a
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INTRODUCTION 
On January 14, 2010, four Hellfire missiles fired from an 
unmanned aerial vehicle (“drone”) slammed into a compound 
in Pakistan’s South Waziristan region, killing ten people.1 
Hakimullah Mehsud, leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(“TTP”), was the reported target of the strike.2 Already the 
eighth US drone attack in Pakistan in 2010,3 these strikes 
followed two consecutive years of dramatically increased drone 
activity within Pakistan. Despite a high degree of media and 
scholarly interest in the United States’ use of drones in Pakistan, 
little attention has focused on whether the United States is 
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1. See US Drone Attack Reportedly Injures Pakistan Taleban Chief Mehsud, BBC 
MONITORING S. ASIA, Jan. 15, 2010; Pakistan Taliban Says Leader Injured in Attack, CNN, 
Jan. 15, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-15/world/pakistan.taliban_1_baitullah-
mehsud-drone-strike-hakimullah-mehsud?_s=PM:WORLD. 
2. Mehsud Was Target of Attacks, UNITED PRESS INT’L [UPI], Jan. 14, 2010, 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/01/14/Mehsud-was-target-of-attacks/UPI-
78931263530640. For nearly four months following the January 14, 2010 drone strike, 
Mehsud’s death was the subject of speculation and controversy. Ultimately, in early May 
2010, video and audio tapes of Mehsud surfaced. Those tapes, produced in early April 
2010, demonstrated that Mehsud had survived the strike. See, e.g., Hakimullah Mehsud is 
Alive, UPI, May 3, 2010, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/05/03/
Hakimullah-Mehsud-is-alive/UPI-73561272904165; Video Shows Taliban Chief Hakimullah 
Mehsud “Alive,” BBC NEWS, May 3, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8657730.stm. 
3. Mehsud Was Target of Attacks, supra note 2. The United States launched fifty-three 
drone strikes in 2009 and thirty-four strikes in 2008. See Peter Bergen & Katherine 
Tiedemann, The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2010, 
COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY INITIATIVE POL’Y PAPER (New American Foundation, 
Washington, D.C.), Feb. 24, 2010, at 3. 
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engaged in an armed conflict in Pakistan, as defined and 
categorized by international humanitarian law (“IHL”).4 Instead, 
most analyses consider the efficacy of the campaign or the 
legality of the use of force and, in particular, the use of drones 
for so-called targeted killings. The primary debate has centered 
on whether the United States is acting lawfully in self-defense and 
presumes that the US drone campaign in Pakistan is an 
extension of either the NATO campaign in Afghanistan or the 
broader US conflict with Al Qaeda.5 Those who argue that the US 
drone attacks do not qualify as self-defense thus find that the 
United States is in violation of the international law governing 
the resort to force (jus ad bellum),6 and add that Pakistan has not 
specifically requested US support against militants within 
Pakistan.7 In contrast, some argue that the US drone campaign is 
justifiable self-defense, but suggest that actions taken in self-
defense by a state against a nonstate actor do not necessarily 
result in an armed conflict.8 Kenneth Anderson, in particular, 
views the drone campaign through a lens of self-defense and sees 
each drone strike as a discrete self-defense event.9 The report of 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings 
addresses the parameters and definition of armed conflict in 
analyzing the legality of the drone strikes, but does not reach a 
 
4. See Shane Harris, Are Drone Strikes Murder?, NAT’L J., Jan. 9, 2010, at 14; Jane 
Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the C.I.A.'s Covert Drone Program?, NEW 
YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, at 37, 40–41. 
5. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of 
Pakistan 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN 
CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed., forthcoming 2010); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targeting 
of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 FLA. ST. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1520717. See generally Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killings in 
U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA 
FOR REFORM (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009). 
6. See O’Connell, supra note 5, at 14–15. 
7. See id. at 17. 
8. See e.g., Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 
111th Cong. 5 (2010) (written testimony of Kenneth Anderson, Professor, Washington 
College of Law, American University); Kenneth Anderson, Predators over Pakistan, 
WEEKLY STANDARD, Mar. 8, 2010, at 30–33; Paust, supra note 5. 
9. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 366–70. 
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definitive conclusion regarding the existence or nature of the 
conflict in Pakistan.10 
However, it is unsatisfactory to simply dismiss each drone 
strike as a discrete self-defense response—thus obviating the 
need to examine whether the United States is in an armed 
conflict in Pakistan—without examining whether the whole of 
the campaign might rise to the level of an armed conflict. The 
level of violence attending the drone campaign, the increasing 
rate of drone strikes since 2008, the drone campaign’s focus on 
the TTP, and the ongoing hostilities between Pakistan and the 
TTP all combine to make an assessment of the existence and 
nature of an armed conflict critical at this juncture. Moreover, 
the existence of armed conflict triggers the application of 
international humanitarian law, otherwise known as the law of 
armed conflict or the law of war. The law of armed conflict 
governs the conduct of both states and individuals during armed 
conflict and seeks to minimize suffering in war by protecting 
persons not participating in hostilities and by restricting the 
means and methods of warfare.11 
This Article examines whether the United States is engaged 
in an armed conflict—as defined by IHL—with the TTP in 
Pakistan, and if so, explores the nature of that engagement. Part 
I provides background information on the TTP and other 
militant groups; the development and current state of hostilities 
 
10. See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
Study on Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, ¶¶ 53–56, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/14/24Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston). 
11. See International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], International 
Humanitarian Law in Brief, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/
section_ihl_in_brief. The law of armed conflict is set forth primarily in the four Geneva 
Conventions of August 14, 1949 and their Additional Protocols. Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 
[hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. 
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between Pakistan and the TTP; and the US drone campaign in 
Pakistan, particularly against targets linked to the TTP. Part II 
applies the legal framework of armed conflict to the situation in 
Pakistan. After setting forth the definition and elements of 
armed conflict, this Part analyzes the nature of the conflict 
between Pakistan and the TTP. Finally, Part III examines US 
involvement in the conflict in Pakistan to assess whether it 
constitutes an intervention in an ongoing conflict or a separate 
parallel conflict and how such determinations might affect the 
applicable law. 
I. TEHRIK-E-TALIBAN PAKISTAN AND HOSTILITIES IN 
PAKISTAN 
In December 2007, Pakistani tribal militias from across the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (“FATA”) and the 
Northwest Frontier Province (“NWFP”)12 united to become 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. TTP is an umbrella group for what 
were once locally-oriented tribal militias involved in varying, 
individualized conflicts with the state of Pakistan.13 Unlike other 
armed groups operating in northwest Pakistan, which focus their 
primary efforts on combating the government of Afghanistan 
and NATO (often with the support, tacit or otherwise, of the 
Pakistani government),14 the TTP directly opposes the 
 
12. The Northwest Frontier Province was officially renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
on April 15, 2010. Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act of 2010 (Pak.), available at 
http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/files/Pakistan_2010.pdf. For the sake 
of familiarity, this Article will continue to refer to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by its former 
name. 
13. See Brian Fishman, The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict across the FATA 
and NWFP, COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY INITIATIVE POL’Y PAPER (New American 
Foundation, Washington D.C.), Apr. 2010, at 6. The forty-person shura that produced 
the TTP included leaders from all seven FATA tribal agencies, as well as several districts 
in the NFWP. Id. 
14. For example, the Haqqani Network, founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani and 
currently led by his son Sirajuddin, is an independent armed group that operates from 
North Waziristan. Jalaluddin rose to prominence by being a remarkably successful 
mujahid during the Soviet War in Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network seeks to drive 
NATO from Afghanistan and is believed to receive support from the government of 
Pakistan. See Nahal Toosi, Haqqani Network Challenges US-Pakistan Relations, ABC NEWS, 
Dec. 29, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9442987. Similarly, 
Hafiz Gul Bahadar leads an armed group in North Waziristan that is focused on 
launching attacks against NATO in Afghanistan rather than against the state of Pakistan. 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM, Apr. 6, 2010 
[hereinafter JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY]. Though he was among the founders of 
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government of Pakistan. The TTP seeks to establish an Islamic 
emirate in Pakistan modeled after the Afghan Taliban’s Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan.15 Although the TTP also shares the 
Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network’s goals of disrupting 
NATO operations in Afghanistan and ousting the Afghan 
government of President Hamid Karzai, the Afghan Taliban’s 
Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network view the Pakistani state 
as a benefactor and seek accommodation with it.16 The TTP, in 
contrast, focuses primarily on its opposition to the Pakistani state. 
Thus, elements of the Pakistani government sometimes describe 
the TTP as the “bad Taliban,” while referring to the Afghan 
Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and similarly aligned groups as 
the “good Taliban.”17 
Pakistan was at odds with—and in many cases, engaged in 
hostilities against—many of these locally-oriented militia before 
the TTP’s formation,18 but the conflict between the Pakistani 
state and the TTP, and therefore the otherwise locally-oriented 
militia which comprise it, has intensified noticeably since the 
TTP’s formation. Before the TTP formed, halfhearted Pakistani 
 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (“TTP”), he quickly broke from the group due to the TTP’s 
insistence on fighting the Pakistani state. Id. Armed hostilities have subsequently 
occurred between Bahadar’s fighters and TTP fighters. See id.; Bill Roggio, The Pakistani 
Taliban’s Top Leaders, LONG WAR J., May 17, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2010/05/the_pakistani_taliba_1.php (noting that Bahadar is not a leader of 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan). 
15. JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY, supra note 14; see Fishman, supra note 13, at 6 
(“[Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan] attracted support from militants across the FATA and the 
Malakand division of the NWFP by arguing that Pakistan’s support for the U.S. and 
NATO effort in Afghanistan made the government illegitimate.”). 
16. See Bill Roggio, US Airstrike Targets Haqqani Network in North Waziristan, LONG 
WAR J., Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/01/us_airstrike_
targets_3.php. The Quetta Shura refers to the governing body of the Afghan Taliban led 
by Mullah Omar. It is called the Quetta Shura because it is believed to receive sanctuary 
in—and operate from—the Pakistani city of Quetta, located in Baluchistan. See Bill 
Roggio, The Afghan Taliban’s Top Leaders, LONG WAR J., Feb. 23, 2010, 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/the_talibans_top_lea.php. 
17. See Bill Roggio, Latest US Airstrike Kills 3 in North Waziristan, LONG WAR J., Feb. 
17, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/latest_us_airstrike_1.php 
(“The Pakistani military and government are unwilling to target Bahadar and the 
Haqqanis as these two are viewed as ‘good Taliban’ since they do not directly threaten 
the Pakistani state and are seen as part of Pakistan's strategic depth against India and 
Afghanistan.”). 
18. See Sameer Lalwani, Pakistan’s COIN Flip: The Recent History of Pakistani Military 
Counterinsurgency Operations in the NWFP and FATA, COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
INITIATIVE POL’Y PAPER (New American Foundation, Washington D.C.), Apr. 2, 2010, at 
1–2. 
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military offensives against locally-oriented tribal militias 
produced peace agreements that generally bolstered the 
militants.19 For example, in 2004, the Pakistani military launched 
a campaign against Nek Muhammad, a tribal leader in South 
Waziristan,20 which ultimately led to Pakistan agreeing to 
compensate Muhammad for the fighters and materiel he lost in 
exchange for his commitment to register foreign fighters in the 
area and cease hostilities against the state.21 Muhammad abided 
by neither condition.22 In the wake of a similar offensive against 
Baitullah Mehsud in 2006, Pakistan essentially legitimized 
Mehsud’s control of South Waziristan.23 
Pakistan initially approached the TTP in a similar manner: 
halfhearted assaults followed by cease-fire agreements. In fact, 
the government of Pakistan was reluctant to ban the TTP at first. 
By August 2008, however, the government of Pakistan had 
embraced a qualitatively different approach to addressing the 
TTP threat.24 That month, Pakistan launched an offensive in the 
Bajaur Agency25 that, after seven months of continuous 
operations, forced the local TTP commander, Faqir Muhammad, 
to declare a cease-fire.26 
Following the Bajaur offensive, Pakistan launched assaults 
on the TTP in Orakzai, South Waziristan, and the Swat Valley. In 
April and May 2009, Pakistan deployed more than 15,000 
soldiers, supported by artillery and air power, to the Swat Valley 
to combat the TTP in Pakistan’s “most concerted and successful 
 
19. See, e.g., Scott Stewart, Pakistan: The South Waziristan Migration, STRATFOR, Oct. 
14, 2009, available at http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091014_pakistan_south_
waziristan_migration. 
20. See Lalwani, supra note 18, at 2. 
21. See Fishman, supra note 13, at 9. 
22. See id. 
23. See id. 
24. See JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY, supra note 14. 
25. Agencies are administrative subdivisions in Pakistan's Federally Administered 
Territories. There are seven agencies within FATA: Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, 
Orakzai, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan. Jayshree Bajoria, Pakistan's Tribal 
Areas, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Nov. 9, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/
11973/pakistans_tribal_areas.html. 
26. Id.; Bill Roggio, Taliban Has ‘Lost’ in Bajaur, Mohmand: Pakistan Military, LONG 
WAR J., Mar. 1, 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/03/taliban_lost_
in_baja.php. 
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campaign to date.”27 On the heels of its offensive in Swat, 
Pakistan launched a similar assault on the TTP’s heartland in 
South Waziristan in October 2009.28 Some 30,000 Pakistani 
soldiers, again backed by air support and artillery, launched an 
attack on an estimated 7000 to 10,000 TTP and foreign 
militants.29 By December 2009, the Pakistani government was 
hinting at victory in South Waziristan and looking forward to its 
offensive in Orakzai.30 Finally, in March 2010, the Pakistani army 
pushed into Orakzai, where many TTP leaders and fighters 
reportedly fled following the October 2009 assault on South 
Waziristan.31 The Pakistani military declared victory over the TTP 
in Orakzai on June 1, 2010.32 
The United States launched what is believed to be its first 
drone attack inside Pakistan in 2004, targeting and killing Nek 
Muhammad, the South Waziristan tribal leader.33 The United 
States launched just eight more drone strikes in Pakistan through 
the end of 2007.34 Beginning in 2008, the United States 
dramatically increased its use of drones in Pakistan, launching 
thirty-four attacks, killing between 263 and 296 individuals—of 
these, between 106 and 134 are believed to have been militants.35 
 
27. Pakistan Steps Up Swat Offensive, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/south_asia/8043185.stm (last updated May 11, 2009). See generally JANE’S WORLD 
INSURGENCY, supra note 14. 
28. Aryn Baker, Pakistan: Behind the Waziristan Offensive, TIME, Oct. 18, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1930909,00.html. 
29. Id. 
30. Nahal Toosi, Pakistan Eyes Taliban Front after S. Waziristan, ABC NEWS, Dec. 12, 
2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9318842 (“‘The operation in 
South Waziristan is over. Now there are talks about Orakzai,’ [Pakistani Prime Minister 
Yousuf Raza] Gilani told reporters in televised remarks from the eastern city of 
Lahore.”). 
31. See, e.g., 40 Militants Killed in Pakistan, HINDUSTAN TIMES (New Delhi), Mar. 25, 
2010, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/pakistan/40-militants-
killed-in-Pakistan/Article1-523232.aspx. 
32. Anwar Shakir, Pakistan’s Military Completes Offensive in Orakzai Tribal Area, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 1, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-
01/pakistan-s-military-completes-offensive-in-orakzai-tribal-area.html. 
33. David Rohde & Mohammed Khan, Ex-Fighter for Taliban Dies in Strike in 
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2004, at A6. Shortly before his death, Muhammad and his 
fighters had driven the Pakistani state to negotiations after the Pakistani government 
attempted—and failed—to establish its writ over South Waziristan in April 2004. Id. 
34. Bergen & Tiedemann, supra note 3, at 3. 
35. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, NEW AMERICA FOUND., Year of the Drone: 
An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010, http://counterterrorism.
newamerica.net/drones (last updated Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Year of the Drone]. 
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In 2009, the United States launched fifty-three strikes—a rate of 
at least one drone strike per week; in the first half of 2010, the 
United States is on pace to double the total number of 2009 
drone assaults in Pakistan. 
Accurately determining the proportion of drone strikes that 
specifically target the TTP is difficult. Open source analyses rely 
on news reporting, which is severely restricted in FATA and 
NWFP. News reports also generally do not distinguish among the 
various militant organizations operating in Northwest Pakistan. 
Those considerations aside, however, a large proportion of the 
drone strikes appear to be aimed at the TTP’s leadership and 
infrastructure. In 2009, for example, the United States launched 
at least sixteen attacks—nearly one third of all drone strikes that 
year—directly targeting the leader of the TTP, Baitullah Mehsud, 
and eventually killing him on August 5, 2009.36 Three drone 
strikes have targeted Baitullah’s successor and clansman, 
Hakimullah Mehsud, since his accession as amir of the TTP.37 Of 
the fifty-three strikes launched in 2009, twenty-six were launched 
against targets in South Waziristan, the TTP’s heartland, while an 
additional twenty-three targeted North Waziristan, where the 
TTP operates but competes for control with Hafiz Gul Bahadar.38 
Of the forty-five drone strikes in Pakistan between January 1, 
2010 and June 30, 2010, only eighteen are clearly linked to a 
particular militant group: nine strikes targeted the militants 
linked to Hafiz Gul Bahadur, five targeted the TTP, two targeted 
Al Qaeda, and two definitively targeted the Haqqani Network.39 
 
36. Id. 
37. Strikes on January 14, 15, and 17, 2010, are all believed to have targeted 
Hakimullah Mehsud. Imitaz Gul, Death by Drone?, FOREIGN POL’Y, Jan. 31, 2010, 
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/31/death_ by_ drone_ is_ hakimullah_ 
mehsud_ dead_or_alive; Pakistan Taleban Chief Hakimullah Mehsud “Safe,” BBC 
MONITORING SOUTH ASIA, Jan. 14, 2010; Year of the Drone, supra note 35. In addition, it is 
likely that more strikes would have targeted him were it not for the nearly four months 
of 2010 during which he was widely believed to be dead. Bergen & Tiedemann, supra 
note 3, at 4. 
38. See Year of the Drone, supra note 35. 
39. See id. These numbers diverge from the target coding done by the New America 
Foundation, which does not differentiate between the TTP, Hafiz Gul Bahadar, and the 
manifold other armed groups in Northwest Pakistan. This Article’s target affiliation 
attribution is, like the New America Foundation’s, based on open source reporting that 
is frequently imprecise and contradictory. The broader point remains that armed 
individuals in Northwest Pakistan do not belong to a single organization and the United 
States is not targeting members of just one organization. 
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Twenty-six of the remaining twenty-seven strikes occurred in 
North Waziristan, where the TTP has found refuge since 
Pakistan’s offensives in Swat and South Waziristan.40 Importantly, 
fifteen of these strikes have occurred in and around Miranshah,41 
a reported TTP “stronghold.”42 
Over the past two years, the TTP has attacked NATO and US 
forces in addition to attacking Pakistani targets. For instance, the 
TTP has attacked NATO convoys transiting through Pakistan,43 
and has launched attacks killing US military advisors inside 
Pakistan.44 It has also launched a “fedayeen style” attack on the US 
Consulate in Peshawar, involving both car bombs and an assault 
team armed with rocket launchers and automatic weapons.45 
Reports also indicate that the TTP participated in the suicide 
bomber attack on Forward Operating Base Chapman that killed 
seven Central Intelligence Agency employees,46 an attack that was 
followed closely by the spate of drone strikes targeting TTP 
leader Hakimullah Mehsud. 
 
40. See id.; Omar Waraich & Andrew Buncombe, CIA Drones Kill 14 in Strike Linked 
to Times Square Plot, INDEPENDENT (London), May 12, 2010, at 30. 
41. Year of the Drone, supra note 35. 
42. See, e.g., Zeeshan Haider, Analysis: The Ties that Kill: Pakistan Militant Groups 
Uniting, REUTERS ALERTNET, May 30, 2010, available at http://www.alertnet.org/
thenews/newsdesk/SGE64O0AU.htm; Syed Mozzam Hashmi, Pakistan Nods Affirmative 
for North Waziristan Operation, XINHUA (Beijing), June 10, 2010, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-06/10/c_13344208.htm 
(“Miranshah, the headquarters of North Waziristan, and Mir Ali are reported to be the 
strongholds of Al-Qaeda that include TTP . . . .”); Punjabi Taliban Leader Qari Zafar Killed 
in US Drone Attack, THE STATESMAN (Kolkata), Feb. 26, 2010, 
http://www.thestatesmen.net/news/punjabi-taliban-leader-qari-zafar-killed-in-us-drone-
attack/ (highlighting relationship between Miranshah-based Qari Zafar and TTP amir 
Hakimullah Mehsud); cf. Sherin Zada, Suicide Car Bomber Kills Soldier in NW Pakistan, 
ABC NEWS, July 5, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=11088076 
(noting that the Pakistani Army claimed to have killed Amirullah Mehsud, a top Tehrik-
e-Taliban commander, in Miranshah). 
43. Mansoor Khan, 3 Hurt as NATO Convoy Ambushed in Karachi, THE NATION 
(Islamabad), Jan. 28, 2010, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-
english-online/Opinions/29-Jan-2010/3-hurt-as-Nato-convoy-ambushed-in-Karachi; 
Shahan Mufti, Taliban Hijacking Threatens Key NATO Supply Route, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Nov. 12, 2008, at 25; Jane Perlez, 100 Trucks of Supplies Destroyed in Pakistan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, at A6. 
44. See, e.g., Pakistan: Americans at Girls School in Lower Dir Were Target, RIGHT VISION 
NEWS (Lahore), Feb. 5, 2010; Declan Walsh, US Soldiers and Schoolgirls among Seven Killed 
by Taliban Bomb Attack in North-west Pakistan, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 4, 2010, at 17. 
45. JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY, supra note 14. 
46. Roy Gutman & Saeed Shah, Taliban Chief Tied to CIA Bombing Believed Dead, 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 1, 2010, at A6. 
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II. THE EXISTENCE OF AN ARMED CONFLICT: APPLYING 
THE LAW TO THE FACTS ON THE GROUND 
IHL applies only during an armed conflict, so determining 
whether violence between states, between a state and a nonstate 
actor, or between two or more nonstate actors rises to the level of 
an armed conflict is a foundational analytical step. In Pakistan, 
three actors are engaged in hostilities of some type, whether or 
not they rise to the level of an armed conflict: Pakistan, the 
United States, and various nonstate actors, including the TTP. 
The nature of these hostilities, the key inquiry here, determines 
whether and what part of IHL applies to the conduct of the 
parties and the status of persons in the conflict areas. 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions endeavor to address all 
instances of armed conflict47 and set forth two primary categories 
of armed conflict that trigger the application of IHL: 
international armed conflict and non-international armed 
conflict. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of August 
1949 states that the Conventions “shall apply to all cases of 
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one of them.”48 Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions of August 1949 sets forth minimum 
provisions applicable “in the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the 
High Contracting Parties.”49 Notably, the Geneva Conventions 
adopted the term “armed conflict” specifically to avoid the 
technical legal and political pitfalls of the term “war.”50 As such, 
 
47. ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE 
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 26 (Oscar M. Uhler & Henri Coursier 
eds., 1958) [hereinafter GC IV COMMENTARY] (“Born on the battlefield, the Red Cross 
called into being the First Geneva Convention to protect wounded or sick military 
personnel. Extending its solicitude little by little over other categories of war victims, in 
logical application of its fundamental principle, it pointed the way, first to the revision of 
the original convention, and then to the extension of legal protection in turn to 
prisoners of war and civilians. The same logical process could not fail to lead to the idea 
of applying the principle in all cases of armed conflicts, including those of an internal 
character.”). 
48.  GC I, supra note 11, art. 2; GC II, supra note 11, art. 2; GC III, supra note 11, 
art. 2; GC IV, supra note 11, art. 2. 
49.  GC I, supra note 11, art. 3; GC II, supra note 11, art. 3; GC III, supra note 11, 
art. 3; GC IV, supra note 11, art. 3. 
50. See generally GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 47, at 17–25 (addressing Article 2 
common to the Geneva Conventions). 
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determination of the existence of an armed conflict does not 
turn on a formal declaration of war—or even on how the 
participants characterize the hostilities—but rather on the facts 
of a given situation.51 
Just as the existence of an armed conflict triggers the 
application of IHL to govern the status of persons and the rights 
and obligations of parties to the conflict, the nature of the 
conflict—whether international or non-international—
determines the extent of the applicable law. International armed 
conflicts are subject to the full panoply of the Geneva 
Conventions and the customary laws of war.52 Non-international 
armed conflicts are subject to the more limited legal regime of 
Common Article 3 and the steadily growing customary 
international law applicable in non-international armed conflict, 
including the principles of humanity, proportionality, 
distinction, and necessity.53 In particular, Common Article 3 
provides that civilians or individuals who are hors de combat shall 
not be killed or tortured, taken as hostages, or subjected to 
humiliating or degrading treatment. Common Article 3 further 
requires measures to care for the wounded and sick. Within the 
Common Article 3 framework, parties to a non-international 
 
51. Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions applies to “all cases of 
declared war or of any other armed conflict . . . between two or more [states], even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one of them.” GC I, supra note 11, art. 2; GC II, supra 
note 11, art. 2; GC III, supra note 11, art. 2; GC IV, supra note 11, art. 2; see, e.g., Anthony 
Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in International 
Humanitarian Law, 183 MIL. L. REV. 66, 85 (2005) (“[I]t is worth emphasizing that 
recognition of the existence of armed conflict is not a matter of state discretion.”). 
52. Geoffrey S. Corn, What Law Applies to the War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON 
TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 1, 15 (Michael Lewis et al. eds., 
2009). 
53. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 100–27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia [ICTY] Oct. 2, 1995) (highlighting the development and applicability of 
necessity, distinction, humanity, and proportionality to internal armed conflict); 
LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 133–34 (2002); Geoffrey S. Corn 
& Eric T. Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 788, 827 (2008); Christopher 
Greenwood, International Law and the Tadic Decision, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 265, 275–78 
(1996); see Abella v. Argentina (La Tablada), Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 
55/97, ¶¶ 176–77 (1997); Maj. Ian G. Corey, The Fine Line between Policy and Custom: 
Prosecutor v. Tadic and the Customary International Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 166 MIL. 
L. REV. 145 (2000); Cullen, supra note 51, at 66; William A. Schabas, Punishment of Non-
State Actors in Non-International Armed Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 907 (2003). 
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armed conflict can also enter into special agreements to 
implement additional provisions of the Geneva Conventions.54 
A. Defining Armed Conflict 
Neither Common Article 2 nor Common Article 3 
specifically defines armed conflict. The most common and oft-
cited contemporary definition of armed conflict is from the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in Prosecutor v. Tadić, where the 
tribunal held that an armed conflict exists whenever “there is a 
resort to armed force between States or protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State.”55 The first 
portion of the definition refers to international armed conflict; 
the second to non-international armed conflict. 
According to the Commentary to the Geneva Conventions 
(“Commentary”), “[a]ny difference arising between two States 
and leading to the intervention of armed forces is an armed 
conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties 
denies the existence of a state of war.”56 The duration of the 
hostilities or the number of wounded or killed does not impact 
the characterization as an armed conflict. The facts on the 
ground in Pakistan demonstrate that the present situation there 
does not constitute an international armed conflict because there 
 
54. See Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 69 (ICTY May 5, 
2009) (“However, even in the context of an internal armed conflict, Geneva Convention 
III applies where the parties to the conflict have agreed that the Convention shall apply. 
In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls the ECCM instructions to its monitors on 
the implementation of the Zagreb Agreement which indicated that the Geneva 
Conventions were to be applied to the prisoners of war.”); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. 
IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 583 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) 
(describing an agreement entered into by the then Presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the Croatian Democratic Community, and the Serbian Democratic Party to apply certain 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions in accord with Common Article 3). 
55. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (ICTY Oct. 2, 1995). Indeed, the so-called 
Tadić test has not only been the driving factor in the ICTY’s jurisprudence, it was also 
adopted by the drafters of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal 
Court and by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; see also 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 620 (Sept. 2, 1998); Cullen, 
supra note 51, at 98. 
56. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 47, at 20. 
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is no conflict between two High Contracting Parties. The United 
States and Pakistan are indeed both High Contracting Parties,57 
but they are not engaged in hostilities against each other. 
The next inquiry, then, is whether the situation in Pakistan 
meets the requirements of Common Article 3, which provides a 
minimum threshold for distinguishing internal armed conflict 
from riots or banditry.58 According to the Commentary, no 
specific test for determining the applicability of Common Article 
3 exists; rather, the goal is to interpret Common Article 3 as 
broadly as possible.59 The Commentary does, however, offer 
some guidance in the form of indicative—but not dispositive—
factors or characteristics of a Common Article 3 conflict based on 
the nature and behavior of both state and nonstate parties. For 
example, the response of the state is a critical component,60 in 
particular whether it employs its regular armed forces in 
combating the nonstate actor and whether it has recognized the 
nonstate actor as a belligerent. In addition, several 
considerations can provide useful guidance for understanding 
whether violence or hostilities have progressed beyond internal 
disturbances, such as whether the nonstate actor: (1) has an 
organized military force; (2) has an authority responsible for its 
acts; (3) acts within a determinate territory, having the means of 
ensuring respect for the Geneva Conventions; and (4) acts as a 
de facto governing entity with its armed forces prepared to obey 
the laws of war.61 
 
57. The United States ratified the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 on 
August 2, 1955. Pakistan ratified the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 on June 12, 
1951. State Parties/Signatories to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, ICRC, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited Nov. 3, 
2010). 
58. See Corn, supra note 52, at 16–17; Cullen, supra note 51, at 70; see also Richard 
A. Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL 
ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 197–99 (James N. Rosenau ed., 1964); cf. LOTHAR KOTZSCH, 
THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 230 (1956) 
(defining rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency). 
59. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 47, at 36 (“Does this mean Article 3 is not 
applicable in cases where armed strife breaks out in a country, but does not fulfill any of 
[the suggested criteria]? We do not subscribe to this view. We think, on the contrary, 
that the Article should be applied as widely as possible.”). 
60. Corn, supra note 52, at 17. 
61. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 47, at 35–36. None of these factors is 
dispositive; rather, these and other factors may be used to distinguish acts of banditry, 
short-lived insurrection, or terrorist acts from armed conflict. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, 
Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49 (ICTY Apr. 3, 2008) (examining the number, 
  
164 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:151 
Two considerations have proven to be particularly important 
to courts and tribunals faced with uncertainty about the existence 
of a non-international armed conflict: “the intensity of the 
conflict and the organization of the parties to the conflict.”62 
These criteria help to “distinguish[] an armed conflict from 
banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist 
activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian 
law.”63 For example, when anti-government protestors attacked 
an Argentine military barracks, leading to a thirty-hour firefight, 
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights differentiated 
the events from a “situation of internal disturbances . . . 
[because] what happened at [La Tablada] was not equivalent to 
large scale violent demonstrations, students throwing stones at 
the police, bandits holding hostages for ransom, or the 
assassination of government officials for political reasons.”64 
Instead, the court concluded that “the concerted nature of the 
hostile acts undertaken by the attackers, the direct involvement 
of governmental armed forces, and the nature and level of the 
violence” rendered the attack on, and recapture of, the barracks 
at La Tablada an armed conflict, triggering IHL.65 
B. The Nature of the Conflict between Pakistan and the TTP 
As detailed above, the nature and quantity of the armed 
engagements between Pakistan and militant groups, including 
 
duration, and intensity of individual confrontations); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-
03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 84 (ICTY Nov. 30, 2005) (examining the increasing frequency of 
clashes, the use of heavy weapons and mortars, as well as armored personal carriers, and 
the deployment of regular armed forces); Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, 
Judgment, ¶¶ 879–88 (ICTY July 20, 2009) (highlighting the territorial control and 
administration exerted by a militia as demonstrative of its degree of organization); 
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 562–67 (highlighting the 
geographic distribution of clashes and examining whether a militia had captured and 
held territory); Sylvain Vite, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Law: Legal Concepts 
and Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 76–77 (2009). 
62. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 562 (ITCY May 7, 1997); Vite, supra 
note 61, at 75–76. 
63. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 562. Government forces are presumed 
to be sufficiently organized to be a party to an armed conflict. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-
84-T, Judgment, ¶ 60; Vite, supra note 61, at 77. 
64. La Tablada, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97, ¶ 154 (1997). 
65. Id. ¶ 155 (“[P]articularly, the attackers involved carefully planned, coordinated 
and executed an armed attack, i.e., a military operation, against a quintessential military 
objective—a military base.”). 
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the TTP, have developed and changed over the past few years. An 
examination of the current state of the fighting in the context of 
existing jurisprudence regarding the definition of armed conflict 
confirms the already prevalent conclusion in the general media 
that Pakistan and the TTP—and possibly the United States—are 
involved in an armed conflict. This section will analyze the two 
main considerations—intensity and organization—to 
demonstrate that the fighting between the TTP and Pakistan 
does indeed meet the standard for a Common Article 3 non-
international armed conflict. 
1. Intensity 
Intensity requires an analysis of the seriousness of the 
fighting in order to determine whether it has passed from riots 
and other random acts of violence to engagements more akin to 
regularized military action. Analyzing intensity thus encompasses 
a range of specific factors regarding the actual hostilities. For 
example, the ICTY considered factors such as the number, 
duration, and intensity of individual confrontations; the types of 
weapons and other military equipment used; the number of 
persons and types of forces engaged in the fighting; the 
geographic and temporal distribution of clashes; the territory 
that has been captured and held; the number of casualties; the 
extent of material destruction; and the number of civilians 
fleeing combat zones.66 The ICTY has also declared that the 
involvement of the UN Security Council may reflect the intensity 
of a conflict.67 Additional relevant factors include the collective 
nature of the fighting, the state’s resort to its armed forces, the 
duration of the conflict, and the frequency of the acts of violence 
and military operations.68 
The intensity and duration of clashes between the 
government of Pakistan and the TTP, the spread of clashes over 
territory and time, and Pakistan’s increasing reliance on its 
regular armed forces in confronting the TTP indicate that the 
TTP and the Pakistani state are in an armed conflict. While none 
of these three factors are necessarily dispositive of a conflict 
 
66. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49; Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 
Judgment, ¶¶ 135–43; Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 564–65. 
67. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49. 
68. Vite, supra note 61, at 76. 
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sufficiently intense to be an armed conflict, taken together they 
suggest a level of violence that exceeds the minimum threshold 
in Common Article 3. 
a. Seriousness of Attacks and Increase in Armed Clashes 
Clashes between the government of Pakistan and elements 
of the TTP have already spanned nearly two-and-a-half years. 
Since mid-2009, the Pakistani government launched offensives in 
Bajaur, Orakzai, South Waziristan, and Swat.69 The recent 
fighting in Orakzai has involved 7000 Pakistani troops.70 The 
Pakistani newspaper Dawn has described the fighting in Orakzai 
as a “relentless military offensive.”71 Large-scale clashes involving 
the use of air strikes, artillery, and thousands of Pakistani troops 
were nearly continuous between October 2009, when the 
Pakistani government began its campaign in South Waziristan, 
and June 2010, when the Pakistan Army declared victory over the 
TTP in Orakzai. Since its inception, the TTP has launched 
attacks against government targets including Frontier Corps 
outposts, the Pakistani General Headquarters, military convoys, 
and police stations.72 TTP forces attack Pakistani government 
 
69. See Ismail Khan, Battle for Waziristan Looms, DAWN, Oct. 2, 2009, 
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/
11-battle-for-waziristan-looms--il--12 (Pakistan employed 28,000 troops in its offensive in 
South Waziristan. There, it faced some 6000–7000 TTP and local militants); Sailab 
Mehsud, Army Embarks on Rah-i-Nijat Finally, DAWN, Oct. 18, 2009, 
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/
07-curfew-imposed-in-south-waziristan-ahead-of-operation-ha-01; Times Topics: Swat Valley, 
N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesand
territories/pakistan/northwest-pakistan/swat_valley/index.html (updated Nov. 16, 
2010); Roggio, supra note 26; Bill Roggio, Taliban Kill 9 Pakistani Soldiers in Ambush, 
LONG WAR J., May 10, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/05/
taliban_kill_nine_pa.php (“The Pakistani military launched an offensive in [Orakzai] at 
the end of March, and have claimed success. On April 11, the Inter-Services Public 
Relations directorate, the military's public affairs division, said the Taliban were ‘fleeing’ 
[Orakzai].”). 
70. Anwar Shakir, Pakistan Seizes 2nd Tribal Zone in Anti-Taliban War, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 14, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-14/
pakistan-seizes-second-tribal-region-in-anti-taliban-fight.html; cf. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-
66-T, Judgment, ¶ 151 (highlighting the movement of 300 Serbian government troops); 
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 564–66. 
71. Ten Militants Killed as Orakzai Offensive Continues, DAWN, Apr. 6, 2010, 
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/
provinces/16-ten+militants+killed+as+orakzai+offensive+continues-hs-02. 
72. See, e.g., Pakistani Troops Kill 11 Militants in Orakzai, BBC MONITORING SOUTH 
ASIA, May 9, 2010; Pakistan: TTP Claims Bombing, RIGHT VISION NEWS, May 6, 2010 (“The 
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outposts weekly.73 Over the past two years, 2000 Pakistani soldiers 
and untold hundreds, perhaps thousands, of militants have been 
killed, while hundreds of thousands of Pakistani civilians have 
been displaced by the ongoing hostilities between Pakistan and 
the TTP.74 
Past cases suggest that the types of campaigns and attacks 
and the increasing level of violence in Pakistan are sufficiently 
intense to constitute a non-international armed conflict. For 
example, the ICTY examined the fighting between the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (“KLA”) and the government of Yugoslavia in a 
string of cases to determine if the situation in Kosovo amounted 
to armed conflict, thus giving the tribunal jurisdiction. In 
Prosecutor v. Limaj, the defendant argued that “regionally 
disparate and temporally sporadic attacks carried out over a 
broad and contested geographic area should not be held to 
amount to an armed conflict.”75 The Trial Chamber held that the 
nature of the armed incidents and hostilities were of sufficient 
intensity to constitute an armed conflict. In reaching this 
conclusion, the trial chamber pointed to, for example, firefights 
 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan . . . claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on a police officer 
in the limits of Shakardarra police station on Tuesday . . . .”); Rawalpindi GHQ Attack 
May Trigger Pak Gov’t to Launch Military Offensive in Waziristan, ASIAN NEWS INT’L, Oct. 
21, 2009, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/feature/rawalpindi-ghq-attack-may-
trigger-pak-govt-to-launch-military-offensive-in-waziristan_100259979.html; Bill Roggio, 
Taliban, Frontier Corps Clash in North Waziristan, LONG WAR J., Sept. 28, 2009, 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/09/taliban_frontier_cor.php; Ashfaq 
Yusufzai, Pakistan: Police Pay Heavy Toll in Fight against Terrorism, INTER PRESS SERVICE, 
Feb. 3, 2010. 
73. See generally TOPICS: Pakistan, LONG WAR J., http://www.longwarjournal.org/
cgi-bin/mt-search.cgi?tag=Pakistan&blog_id=7 (providing accounts of various violent 
clashes and confrontations). The Limaj trial chamber emphasized that clashes between 
Serbian government forces and the KLA were occurring every three to seven days. Limaj, 
Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 168. 
74. Jane Perlez & Eric Schmitt, Pakistan Army Finds Taliban Tough to Root Out, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 4, 2010, at A1; Ariane Rummery & Rabia Ali, U.N. High Comm’r on 
Refugees [UNHCR], UNHRC Distributing Winter Aid to Tens of Thousands of Displaced 
Pakistanis, Nov. 24, 2009, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4b0bfc4e9.html (indicating 
that more than 268,000 displaced people from South Waziristan have been verified by 
Pakistan’s National Database and Registration Authority); Tom Wright & Siobhan 
Gorman, Militants Overtake India as Top Threat, Says Pakistan’s ISI, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487039087045754334336701927
48.html (as a demonstration of the intensity of the hostilities, in comparison just over 
2000 multinational (ISAF) soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan over the past nine 
years). 
75.  Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 168 (ICTY Nov. 30, 
2005). 
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that lasted twenty minutes, a clash resulting in sixteen deaths, 
and engagements involving fifty to one hundred rounds of 
ammunition to show that the hostilities were “not accurately 
described as temporally sporadic or geographically 
disperse[d].”76 Rather, “periodic armed clashes occurred 
virtually continuously at intervals averaging three to seven days 
over a widespread and expanding geographic area.”77 Similarly, 
the Tribunal found that a KLA attack against a Serbian police 
station, the deployment of heavy weapons by Serbian government 
forces, and “heavy fighting . . . [that] continued for two days”78 
constituted attacks serious enough to trigger jurisdiction. The 
large scale nature of the armed engagements in Pakistan over the 
past year far outstrip the clashes in Kosovo with regard to the 
number of troops involved, the types of weapons and targets, and 
the number of displaced.79 
b. Distribution of Clashes over Territory and Time 
Armed incidents between Pakistan and the TTP cover a wide 
geographic area and have now been steady for the more than two 
years since the TTP’s formation. Large-scale clashes between the 
TTP and the government of Pakistan have occurred and 
continue to occur in at least three tribal agencies in the FATA 
and four districts in the NWFP, covering an area over 20,079 
square kilometers.80 Smaller scale clashes where the TTP has 
attacked or overrun Frontier Corps posts, without large 
deployments of Pakistani troops in response, have occurred in at 
least two additional FATA tribal agencies.81 Furthermore, the 
 
76. Id. ¶ 168; see id. ¶¶ 138, 140. 
77. Id. ¶ 168. 
78. Id. ¶¶ 138–39, 142. 
79. 180 Taliban Killed in South Waziristan, THE STATESMAN (Kolkata), Nov. 18, 2009 
(“Pakistani security forces have cleared the Taliban stronghold of Srarogha in South 
Waziristan after an intense five-day battle in which 180 militants and seven soldiers were 
killed, an army officer disclosed today.”); see also Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 
¶139 (noting the displacement of eighteen Serbian families in addressing the impact of 
the hostilities). 
80. Pakistan has launched offensives in Buner, Lower Dir, Shangla, and Swat in 
NWFP. It has also launched offensives in Bajaur, Orakzai, and South Waziristan in FATA. 
81. See, e.g., Pakistan: Pre-dawn Pak Violence Kills 32, RIGHT VISION NEWS, Apr. 2, 
2010 (describing a suspected TTP assault on a Frontier Corps post in Khyber Agency); 
Roggio, supra note 72 (describing a suspected TTP assault on a Frontier Corps post in 
North Waziristan). 
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TTP has launched attacks at targets in Rawalpindi, located in 
Punjab, and Peshawar, the capital of NWFP.82 As Pakistan has 
continued its offensives in successive tribal agencies against the 
TTP and the TTP has continued to launch attacks against the 
Pakistani state, these incidents became nearly constant between 
October 2009 and August 2010.83 
In comparison with past determinations of the existence of 
armed conflict, the territorial and temporal reach of the armed 
incidents in Pakistan is substantial. Small scale clashes spread 
over Kosovo—an area comparable to FATA but significantly 
smaller than the FATA plus the NWFP—merited a finding that 
the KLA and the government of Serbia were engaged in a non-
 
82. Rawalpindi GHQ Attack May Trigger Pak Gov’t to Launch Military Offensive in 
Waziristan, ASIAN NEWS INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 21, 2009; JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY, supra 
note 14 (describing the TTP assault on the US consulate in Peshawar). 
83. See, e.g., 7 Soldiers, 48 Ultras Killed in Pakistan, THE STATESMAN (Kolkata), Nov. 1, 
2009, available at 2009 WLNR 21779029; 13 Militants Killed, 2 Commanders Arrested in NW 
Pakistan, XINHUA (Beijing), Dec. 5, 2009; 17 Soldiers, 22 Militants Killed, THE NATION 
(Islamabad), Nov. 12, 2009 (“Stiff Taliban resistance killed at least 17 soldiers Thursday 
in the military’s deadliest day since launching a major offensive in South Waziristan, 
security officials said. The military has pressed around 30,000 forces, backed by 
warplanes and attack helicopters, into battle in a US-endorsed mission to wipe out the 
chief strongholds of Tehreek-e-Taliban in South Waziristan. But troops were dragged 
into fighting when trying to clear rebels from areas adjoining Taliban stronghold of 
Kanigurram.”); Airstrike Kills 66 in Orakzai Agency, DAILY TIMES (Lahore), Mar. 26, 2010; 
Five Militants Killed in Swat, THE PAKISTAN NEWSWIRE, Mar. 2, 2010; Five Pak Security 
Officials Killed in Militant Strike in NWFP, ASIAN NEWS INT’L, Mar. 27, 2010; Pakistan: Over 
40,000 Flee Looming Operation in Orakzai Agency, DAILY THE PAK BANKER, Dec. 14, 2009; 
Pakistan Army Kills 25 Militants in Orakzai Tribal Area, XINHUA (Beijing), Apr. 3, 2010; 
Pakistani Troops Kill 18 Militants in Orakzai Tribal Area, BBC MONITORING SOUTH ASIA, 
Dec. 23, 2009; Troops Backed by Warplanes, Advance from Three Directions, DAILY TIMES 
(Lahore), Oct. 18, 2009 (“The military launched its long-awaited Operation Rah-e-Nijat 
(Path of Salvation) late on Friday night, combating the Hakeemullah Mehsud-led 
Pakistani Taliban in South Waziristan on three different fronts to neutralise the ‘centre 
of gravity of terrorism’ in Pakistan, a military spokesman and several senior officials said. 
The ground offensive comes hours after the country’s military and political leaders 
agreed to stage the final assault on the ‘headquarters of terrorism’ following a wave of 
terror attacks throughout the country in the past two weeks.”); Troops Clear Damadola of 
Taliban, DAILY TIMES (Lahore), Feb. 7, 2010; Troops Retaliate, Kill 18 in Orakzai, SOUTH 
ASIA MEDIA NETWORK, Apr. 11, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 7456604 (“At least 18 
militants were killed and four others arrested when security forces repulsed their attack 
on checkpoint in Orakzai Agency Friday.”); Two Key Taliban Commanders Killed in Swat, 
DAILY TIMES (Lahore), Oct. 25, 2009; Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, Pakistan’s Operation in 
Orakzai: Conjuring ‘Victories,’ EURASIA REV., July 26, 2010, 
http://www.eurasiareview.com/201007265907/pakistans-operation-orakzai-conjuring-
victories-south-asia-intelligence-review.html (listing clashes between the TTP and 
Pakistani forces during June and July 2010). 
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international armed conflict. Moreover, sporadic clashes between 
Serbian government forces and KLA fighters over a period of just 
one year were considered sufficiently constant to constitute an 
armed conflict. In Pakistan, regular clashes involving intensive 
military operations over a broad area and for more than two 
years far outstrip the hostilities in Kosovo. 
c. Increase in the Number and Mobilization of Government 
Forces 
The number of Pakistani troops deployed in the FATA and 
the NWFP has dramatically increased since the formation of the 
TTP.84 Although Pakistan employed mostly lightly trained 
Frontier Corps troops to suppress militant activity in FATA 
before the TTP’s founding, the Pakistani government has used 
tens of thousands of Pakistan’s regular armed forces to confront 
the TTP in FATA and NWFP since 2009.85 In fact, Pakistani 
armed forces have redeployed from the border with India in the 
course of Pakistan’s anti-TTP campaigns.86 Given Pakistan’s 
strategic preoccupation with its Indian rival, the redeployment of 
any regular armed forces from that border is a testament to how 
seriously the government of Pakistan views its confrontation with 
the TTP.87 
Despite Pakistan’s assertions that its efforts to combat the 
TTP are strictly law-enforcement activities, the intensity of the 
fighting between the two sides, the distribution and time span of 
that fighting, and the heavy deployment of regular Pakistani 
armed forces are all indicative of a conflict with an intensity that 
greatly exceeds banditry or a short-lived insurrection. 
 
84. See generally Lalwani, supra note 18. 
85. See id. at 7–9 (“The Pakistani military still uses substantial air power to soften up 
militant targets, but has begun to combine this with more follow-on ground forces to 
disperse militants and secure the area for the local population.”). 
86. Pakistan: Troops’ Shift from East Border to West Border, SOUTH ASIAN MEDIA 
NETWORK, May 1, 2010; Carlotta Gall & Elisabeth Bumiller, Pakistanis Take Steps to Drive 
Out the Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, at A4; Brian Cloughey, Defeating the Taliban in 
Pakistan’s Tribal Areas, INFORMED CONSENT BLOG (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.
juancole.com/2009/11/cloughey-defeating-taliban-in-pakistans.html. 
87. Recently, the Pakistani intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence, 
concluded that militants have eclipsed India as the greatest threat to Pakistan. Tom 
Wright & Siobhan Gorman, Pakistan Says Militants Surpass India as Threat—Fundamental 
Shift Could Affect Afghan War, Bilateral Talks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2010, at A9. 
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2. Organization 
Courts look to a nonstate party’s level of organization as one 
way to distinguish armed conflict from unorganized violence and 
riots. Although a group must have some level of organization to 
be a party to an armed conflict, that level of organization need 
not rise to the level required to establish command responsibility 
for subordinates’ actions.88 Factors the ICTY has identified as 
relevant to determining whether a group is sufficiently organized 
to be a party to an armed conflict include a hierarchical 
structure;89 territorial control and administration;90 the ability to 
recruit and train combatants;91 the ability to launch operations 
using military tactics;92 and the ability to enter peace or cease-fire 
agreements.93 In addition, the ICRC also considers relevant the 
authority to launch attacks bringing together different units and 
the existence or promulgation of internal rules.94 The TTP’s 
hierarchy, control, and administration of territory within 
Pakistan, use of complex assaults, and ability to enter into cease-
fire agreements indicate that it is sufficiently organized to be a 
party to an armed conflict. 
a. Hierarchical Structure 
The TTP is an umbrella organization comprised of disparate 
pro-Taliban groups that once operated independently of one 
another in Pakistan’s FATA and NWFP areas. These component 
groups share several unifying goals, including uniting pro-
Taliban groups in FATA and NWFP against the Pakistani state, 
establishing an Islamic emirate in Pakistan modeled after the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and supporting the Afghan 
Taliban in its campaign against the Karzai government and 
 
88. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 90 (ICTY Nov. 30, 2005). 
89. See id. ¶¶ 95–109. 
90. Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 884 (ICTY July 20, 
2009) (highlighting militias’ organization by noting their control of territory in the 
vicinity of Visregard and their control of “all of the roads”). 
91. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 60 (ICTY Apr. 3, 
2008). 
92. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 884 (“[T]he Muslim forces regularly 
undertook offensive and defensive military actions.”); Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 60. 
93. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 60. 
94. Vite, supra note 61, at 77. 
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NATO.95 Representatives from each of the agencies in FATA and 
the districts in which the TTP is active in NWFP gather at a shura 
to choose the amir who has overall command of the TTP. 
The TTP is not strongly hierarchical when compared to the 
Army of the Republika Srpska (“VRS”), analyzed in Tadić, or the 
KLA, examined in Limaj. In Limaj, the Trial Chamber noted that 
the KLA maintained a general staff, divided Kosovo into zones of 
operation, and appointed zone commanders who were generally 
responsive to commands issued by the KLA’s general staff.96 It 
thus concluded that “the KLA sufficiently possessed the 
characteristics of an organised armed group, able to engage in an 
internal armed conflict.”97 The Tadić Trial Chamber found that 
the VRS was effectively made up of ethnic Serb units ceded from 
the disintegrating Yugoslav People’s Army (“JNA”).98 
Unlike the KLA or the VRS, the TTP does not seem to 
maintain the rigid hierarchy generally associated with armed 
forces. However, just as the ICTY overlooked some of the KLA’s 
organizational faults, noting that these were due to the nascent, 
underground nature of the KLA,99 the TTP’s organizational 
deficiencies may also be attributed to its origin and the nature of 
its conflict with Pakistan. The TTP has divided its area of 
operations between local commanders, but this has occurred 
organically rather than at the TTP’s central direction. The local 
commanders within the TTP are the commanders of the local 
militia that came together to form the TTP. That said, however, 
the TTP maintains a central body that sets the direction and 
policy of the TTP’s component units, much like the KLA’s 
general staff.100 In fact, as a result of disagreement with one or 
more TTP policy directives, one local commander left the TTP 
and hostilities between that commander and the TTP later 
erupted.101 In another similarity with the KLA, the TTP has a 
 
95. See generally JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY, supra note 14; Hassan Abbas, A Profile of 
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, CTC SENTINEL, Jan. 2008, at 1, available at 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss2.pdf. 
96. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 96–104 (ICTY Nov. 30, 
2005). 
97. Id. ¶ 134. 
98. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 114–15 (ICTY May 7, 
1997). 
99. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 94, 104. 
100. CTC SENTINEL, supra note 95; JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY, supra note 14. 
101. JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY, supra note 14. 
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political and public relations operation responsible for issuing 
reports and press releases and for communicating the TTP’s 
goals to the people of Pakistan.102 Thus, although the TTP 
command structure does not appear to be as strongly 
hierarchical as that of the KLA, it is a command structure 
nonetheless and appears sufficient to constitute an organized 
armed group in light of existing jurisprudence.103 
b. Territorial Control and Administration 
Like the VRS and other armed nonstate actors that the ICTY 
and other courts have examined, the TTP exercises control and 
administration over a sizeable portion of Pakistani territory. For 
example, the ICTY determined that armed entities it called 
“Muslim forces” were sufficiently organized to constitute a party 
to an armed conflict in Lukić because they “controlled territory 
in and around the Višegrad municipality.”104 Similarly, in Tadić, 
the Trial Chamber found that the VRS exercised exclusive 
administrative control over Serb-dominated areas of Bosnia.105 
The ICTY also noted that the KLA established checkpoints on 
 
102. For example, after its founding, the TTP issued a communiqué outlining its 
goals. Since then, its spokespersons have asserted the group’s responsibility for some 
attacks, denied responsibility for other attacks, and announced compliance with cease-
fires the group has entered into with the Pakistani government. See, e.g., JANE’S WORLD 
INSURGENCY, supra note 14 (“TTP spokesman Azam Tariq . . . claimed [the October 
2009 attack on Pakistan’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi] had been carried out by 
the TTP’s Punjab unit.”). This activity is similar to that of the KLA described in Limaj. 
See Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶101 (describing how “the General Staff . . . 
issued political statements and communiqués which informed the general public in 
Kosovo and the international community of its objectives and its activities”). 
103. La Tablada, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97, ¶ 155 (1997) 
(“[T]he [La Tablada] attackers involved carefully planned, coordinated and executed 
an armed attack, i.e., a military operation, against a quintessential military objective—a 
military base.”); cf. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 132 (highlighting the 
complexity of KLA operations as indicative of a group’s organization). The ICRC defines 
the level of organization of a group necessary to take part in an armed conflict as one 
with “a sufficient degree of military organization to conduct hostilities on behalf of a 
party to the conflict, albeit not always with the same means, intensity and level of 
sophistication as State armed forces.” ICRC Legal Advisor, Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Law 32 (May 2009). 
104. Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT 98-32/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 884 (ICTY July 20, 
2009). 
105. See generally, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 123–25 
(ICTY May 7, 1997) (describing the Yugoslav People’s Army (“JNA”) taking control of 
various Serbian regions of Bosnia and the transfer of control to the Army of the 
Republika Srpska (“VRS”) after formal JNA withdrawal). 
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highways in Kosovo.106 The TTP does not merely exert 
administrative authority over the environs of a village; rather, it 
administers and has administered entire districts within FATA 
and the NWFP.107 The Pakistani government has launched 
“offensives” against the TTP in a number of tribal agencies—
including both South Waziristan and Orakzai—to “wrest [those 
districts] . . . back from Taliban control.”108 
Finally, and perhaps most telling, the TTP has entered into 
cease-fire and peace agreements with the state of Pakistan.109 
Although these agreements have been largely unfulfilled by 
either side, the fact that the state of Pakistan is willing to—and 
does—enter into agreement with the TTP as an entity strongly 
suggests that the TTP is sufficiently organized to constitute a 
party to an armed conflict. 
c. Complexity of Operations 
The TTP also demonstrates that it can coordinate its armed 
activities, regularly launching complex defensive and offensive 
operations. TTP forces regularly attack Pakistani military outposts 
and, at least twice in 2010, TTP forces have overrun Frontier 
Corps outposts. One or more of these operations were conducted 
at night, involving the use of both small arms and crew-served 
weapons like mortars.110 The TTP has also targeted NATO forces 
by participating in the suicide bombing at Forward Operating 
Base Chapman in Afghanistan on December 30, 2009,111 and 
 
106. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 144–45. 
107. For example, since April 2009, the government of Pakistan has launched 
offensives in Bajaur, Orakzai, South Waziristan, and Swat to retake those agencies. That 
is, the Pakistani state was forced to launch “offensives” against a nonstate actor to 
reassert the state’s authority over those districts. See Bill Roggio, Taliban’s Influence in 
Pakistan’s Northwest, LONG WAR J., http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/maps/
FullImageWrapperLatestFullImage.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). 
108. Anwar Shakir, Pakistan Seizes 2nd Tribal Zone in Anti-Taliban War, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 14, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-14/
pakistan-seizes-second-tribal-region-in-anti-taliban-fight.html. 
109. Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, Pakistan’s Planned Accord with Militants Alarms 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at A10; see Ismail Khan & Carlotta Gall, Pakistan Lets 
Tribal Chiefs Keep Control Along Border, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at A8. 
110. Bill Roggio, Taliban Counterattack in Arakzai, Overrun Military Outpost, LONG 
WAR J., Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/taliban_
counterattac.php. 
111. Roy Gutman & Saeed Shah, Taliban Chief Tied to CIA Bombing Believed Dead, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 1, 2010, at A6. 
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attacking a United States-Pakistani convoy on February 3, 2010.112 
The TTP is such a formidable military force that hostilities with 
the Pakistani state have led to cease-fire agreements and the 
withdrawal of Pakistani government forces from tribal agencies 
controlled by the TTP.113 Indeed, some commentators attribute 
the TTP’s current strength to its ability to fight the Pakistani state 
to stalemates.114 Despite any organizational deficiencies, the TTP 
has demonstrated many times that it can design and implement 
complex military operations.115 
The ICTY highlighted the complexity of KLA activities in 
determining that the KLA was sufficiently organized to constitute 
a party to an armed conflict. Among other activities, the ICTY 
emphasized that the KLA fortified its positions,116 used rocket 
launchers in an attack, which indicated its “ability to conduct 
more sustain[ed] operations,”117 and was able to “offer strong 
and often effective resistance to Serbian forces.”118 These factors 
led the ICTY to determine that “the ability of the KLA to engage 
in such varied operation is a[n] . . . indicator of its level of 
organisation.”119 Similarly, in Lukić, the ICTY highlighted the use 
of “offensive and defensive actions . . . [indicating] . . . military 
planning and tactics” in determining that an armed group was 
sufficiently organized to be a party to an armed conflict.120 These 
actions included fortifying and camouflaging positions, setting 
 
112. Moreover, the Limaj Trial Chamber found it an important indicator of 
organization that the KLA, like the TTP here, was able to engage in varied operations 
over a wide swath of territory. See Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 
172 (ICTY Nov. 30, 2005). 
113. See JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY, supra note 14. 
114. Int’l Crisis Group, Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, at i, Asia Report No. 
178 (Oct. 21, 2009). 
115. Jane Perlez, Pakistan Attacks Show Tightening of Militant Links, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
16, 2009, at A1 (“The assaults in Lahore, coming after a 20-hour siege at the army 
headquarters in Rawalpindi last weekend, showed the deepening reach of the militant 
network, as well as its rising sophistication and inside knowledge of the security forces, 
officials and analysts said. The umbrella group for the Pakistani Taliban, Tehrik-e-
Taliban, claimed responsibility for the attacks in Lahore, the independent television 
news channel Geo reported on its Web site.”). 
116. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, ¶ 79. 
117. Id. ¶ 158 (cited at ¶ 172 as an indicator of the KLA’s organizational capacity). 
118. Id. ¶ 169. 
119. Id. ¶ 172. 
120. Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 880–84 (ICTY July 
20, 2009). 
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ambushes, attacking and holding villages, and using mortars and 
“significant quantities of other forms of ammunition.”121 
The above analysis demonstrates that the conflict between 
Pakistan and the TTP is of sufficient intensity, and the TTP is 
sufficiently organized, to meet the threshold for a non-
international armed conflict under Common Article 3. 
III. CHARACTERIZING US INVOLVEMENT IN PAKISTAN 
Having established the existence of a non-international 
armed conflict in Pakistan between the government and the TTP 
(among other groups, perhaps), this Part analyzes US 
engagement in Pakistan. Foreign state involvement in a conflict 
can take several different forms: recognition of a nonstate actor, 
support for a recognized nonstate actor in violation of neutrality 
principles, intervention, or a wholly separate but parallel conflict. 
This Part will focus on intervention and the notion of a separate 
conflict, the two most relevant options for this analysis. Before 
doing so, this Part will briefly explore the nature of the hostilities 
between the United States and the TTP and whether an armed 
conflict exists. The TTP demonstrates a measure of organization 
and coordination, as set forth above. Therefore, the primary 
question is whether hostilities between the United States and the 
TTP are of sufficient intensity to go beyond isolated targeted 
strikes and cross the threshold of armed conflict. 
A. Hostilities between the United States and the TTP 
The US drone campaign in Pakistan has increased from only 
nine total attacks launched between the outset of the campaign 
in 2004 and the founding of the TTP in late 2007 to thirty-four 
attacks in 2008, fifty-three in 2009, and forty-five in the first half 
of 2010.122 Since the TTP’s founding, drone strikes are estimated 
to have killed between 961 and 1483 individuals, an average of 
seven to eleven individuals per strike. 
Targets of drone strikes have included compounds and 
training camps, as well as individual vehicles or convoys. Each 
drone strike involves one or more Predator or Reaper drones 
 
121. Id. ¶¶ 90–100, 880–84. 
122. See Year of the Drone, supra note 35. 
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firing at least one Hellfire missile at a target.123 Hellfire missiles 
are air-to-ground missiles that are able to deliver a twenty-pound 
warhead. The January 14, 2010 assault on Hakimullah Mehsud, 
for example, reportedly used four Hellfire missiles. A May 11, 
2010 assault on a training camp reportedly operated by Hafiz Gul 
Bahadar, a sometimes ally of the TTP,124 employed eighteen 
Hellfire missiles.125 Drone strikes have spread across the FATA—
an area spanning some 10,500 square miles, which is larger than 
Kosovo.126 While most of the violence between the United States 
and the TTP has been directed by the United States against the 
TTP, the latter has directed attacks against the United States as 
well, including the suicide bombing of Forward Operating Base 
Chapman and an assault on the US Consulate in Peshawar in 
March 2010. The TTP’s primary tactic has been to attack NATO 
convoys passing through Pakistan, killing members of the United 
States armed forces and capturing American materiel.127 
 
123. Jane Perlez & Pir Zubair Shah, Tribal Areas Of Pakistan Are Pounded By Drones, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A8. 
124. Hafiz Gul Bahadar was one of the leaders who took part in the shura that 
created the TTP in December 2007. Shortly after TTP’s formation, Bahadar broke with 
the TTP over the TTP’s insistence on attacking the Pakistani state. Bahadar, in contrast 
to the TTP, does not see the government of Pakistan as his enemy. Like the Afghan 
Taliban and Haqqani, Bahadar views the state of Pakistan as a benefactor. After open 
fighting between Bahadar and the TTP, Mullah Omar, leader of the Afghan Taliban, is 
reported to have brokered a peace agreement between the two organizations. Bahadar 
shares control of North Waziristan with the Haqqani and the TTP. JANE’S WORLD 
INSURGENCY, supra note 14. 
125. Bill Roggio, US Pounds Taliban in Pair of Strikes in North Waziristan, LONG WAR 
J., May 11, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/05/us_pounds_
taliban_co.php. 
126. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas cover 27,220 square kilometers. 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/fata.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 
2010). North Waziristan and South Waziristan have a combined area of 11,327 square 
kilometers. See North Waziristan, GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/pakistan/fata-north-waziristan.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2010); South 
Waziristan, GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/
pakistan/fata-south-waziristan.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). Kosovo’s territory is 10,887 
square kilometers. Kosovo, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). 
127. Chris Brummitt, Officials Say US Missiles Kill 12 at Pakistan Taliban Gathering, 
but Top Chief Is Safe, GUELPH MERCURY (Ontario), Jan. 14, 2010, at 1; Robert Fisk, Shadow 
Lands: Pakistan—A Nation Under Attack, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 6, 2010 (“The 
Taliban's attacks on these [NATO] convoys—both the Pakistani and Afghan versions of 
the movement (for they are not the same)—have over the past two years netted some 
incredible dividends, which NATO has not seen fit to disclose. Gunmen have managed 
to steal three separate—disassembled but complete—military helicopters and a clutch of 
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In light of the seriousness of the attacks the United States 
has launched and continues to launch against the TTP; the 
attacks launched by the TTP against NATO forces and US 
targets; the distribution of the attacks across broad swaths of 
Pakistan; the increasing frequency of US drone strikes; and the 
armaments employed, the violence between the United States 
and the TTP exceeds that associated with riots and banditry and 
likely rises to the level requisite for a non-international armed 
conflict. Given this intensity, and the organization of the TTP, it 
is reasonable to conclude that the United States is engaged in an 
armed conflict with the TTP. This armed conflict could take one 
of two primary forms: an intervention in the conflict between 
Pakistan and the TTP or a separate conflict occurring parallel to 
the one between those two parties. 
B. Intervention 
Intervention is the “interference by a State in the affairs of 
another State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the 
actual condition of things.”128 In Nicaragua v. United States, the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) explained that an 
intervention occurs when a state “intervene[s] directly or 
indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States.”129 For 
the purposes of this Article, the term intervention refers 
specifically to one state’s involvement in another state’s internal 
affairs through force of arms, particularly in the context of an 
ongoing non-international armed conflict. 
 
American Humvee armoured vehicles, one of which was used by the Pakistani Taliban's 
leader, Hakimullah Mehsud. At least 62 Humvees were burned out in just one raid near 
Peshawar in 2008.”); Riaz Khan, 2 Pakistan Bombings Kill 23 near Protest, School, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 19, 2010, at 13 (“[S]uspected Taliban militants in the northwest detonated 
two bombs that destroyed a pair of oil tankers along a vital route used to supply NATO 
and U.S. forces in Afghanistan.”); Pakistan Fighters Torch Afghan Supply Truck, AL ARABIYA 
(Dubai Media City), Mar. 14, 2009, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/03/15/
68478.html; Asif Shahzad, Blast Kills 16 Cadets in Pakistan; NATO Trucks Hit in Separate 
Attack, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 31, 2009, at 4 (“Bombings targeted a Pakistani police 
station and set a NATO fuel convoy ablaze yesterday.”); Delcan Walsh, Taliban Torch 50 
NATO Supply Trucks on Outskirts of Islamabad, GUARDIAN (London), June 9, 2010, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/09/taliban-torch-nato-trucks-pakistan. 
128. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 304 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 
8th ed. 1955). 
129. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27). 
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Armed intervention by a third-party state in an ongoing non-
international armed conflict will complicate that armed conflict 
both politically and legally. First, intervening states usually assert 
multiple defenses of their intervention, frequently and 
simultaneously citing invitation, consent, and self-defense to 
justify their actions.130 Second, and particularly relevant here, the 
characterization of an armed conflict that includes an 
intervening state—regardless of the legality of the 
intervention131—impacts the extent of the applicable IHL.132 
Putting aside the scenario of multilateral intervention for 
peacekeeping,133 intervention may have one of two effects on the 
character of the internal armed conflict, depending on the 
configuration of the parties involved. Intervention in support of a 
nonstate actor against the territorial state places the intervening 
state and the territorial state in an international armed 
conflict.134 For example, many view the US invasion of 
Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks as an 
intervention of a third state on behalf of a nonstate actor. The 
Northern Alliance, a nonstate actor, had been engaged in a civil 
war against the Taliban regime of Afghanistan since the mid-
1990s.135 Once the United States intervened in early October 
2001, it internationalized the armed conflict because two states—
 
130. ANTONIO TANCA, FOREIGN ARMED INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICT 24–
25 (1993). 
131. For a methodological approach to the legality of intervention, see id. See also 
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 209 (“The Court therefore finds that no such general right 
of intervention, in support of an opposition within another State, exists in contemporary 
international law.”). 
132. See Anwar T. Frangi, The Internationalized Noninternational Armed Conflict in 
Lebanon 1975–1990: Introduction to Confligology, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 965, 966–67 (1993). 
133. See Vite, supra note 61, at 87. 
134. Id. at 85–87; Dietrich Schindler, International Humanitarian Law and 
Internationalized Internal Armed Conflicts, 64 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 255, 258–60 (1982); 
Denise Bindschedler-Robert, A Reconsideration of the Law of Armed Conflicts, in THE LAW 
OF ARMED CONFLICTS 52 (1971); see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 
Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 72 (ICTY Oct. 
2, 1995); Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J 14. 
135. Although the Taliban government of Afghanistan was only recognized by 
three states, it was, at least, the de facto government of Afghanistan. US recognition of its 
initial invasion of Afghanistan as an international armed conflict indicates that the 
United States accepted that the Taliban government was the government of 
Afghanistan. Corn, supra note 52, at 4. 
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the United States and Afghanistan—were engaged in hostilities 
with each other.136 
The alternative, intervention in support of the government 
of the territorial state against a nonstate actor—assuming the 
intervening state and the nonstate actor engage in hostilities 
sufficient to establish an armed conflict—puts the intervening 
state and the nonstate actor in a non-international armed 
conflict.137 Thus, following the Taliban’s ouster and the 
establishment of the Karzai government, the ongoing conflict 
between the United States and the now-insurgent Taliban 
became a non-international armed conflict with the United 
States intervening on behalf of the Karzai government.138 
1. Analyzing Intervention 
Past conflicts provide useful examples of both the types of 
intervention and how the complexities of different conflicts can 
make assessing the nature of intervention quite challenging. For 
example, thirty years ago, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on 
behalf of the government of Afghanistan against the mujahideen 
placed the Soviet Union in a non-international armed conflict 
with the mujahideen.139 Notwithstanding significant complicating 
circumstances,140 the Soviet intervention was clearly in opposition 
 
136. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 14 (2004); Corn, supra note 52, at 4 (noting 
that the United States ultimately conceded that the conflict between the United States 
and the Taliban government of Afghanistan was an interstate armed conflict). 
137. See Bindschedler-Robert, supra note 134, at 52; Corn, supra note 52, at 1–2; 
Vite, supra note 61, at 86; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 
7 (2005); Jelena Pejic, Status of Armed Conflicts, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 92 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan 
Breau eds., 2007). 
138. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Making the Case for Conflict Bifurcation in Afghanistan: 
Transnational Armed Conflict, Al Qaeda, and the Limits of the Associated Militia Concept, 85 
INT’L L. STUD. 181, 181–82 (2009). The situation here described—one of intervention 
on behalf of a nonstate actor which becomes the government, transforming the 
intervention into one in support of a state—is remarkably similar to Vietnam’s 
intervention in Cambodia in 1979. See Hans-Peter Gasser, Internationalized Non-
International Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon, 33 AM. 
U. L. REV. 145, 150–52 (1983). 
139. See Gasser, supra note 138, at 145, 148–52; Schindler, supra note 134, at 255–
56. 
140. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a particularly difficult example: both 
the Soviet Union and the government of Afghanistan disputed the existence of an 
armed conflict; the Soviet Union was apparently complicit in a coup d’etat that replaced 
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to the mujahideen and in defense of the Soviet-style government 
then in place in Afghanistan, even if the Soviet Union had 
orchestrated a change in that government’s leadership. Thus, the 
Soviet intervention is most often viewed as an intervention on 
behalf of a government against the nonstate actor challenging it, 
placing the USSR in a non-international armed conflict with the 
mujahideen. 
Similarly, the US engagement in Vietnam—supporting the 
government of the Republic of Vietnam against the National 
Liberation Front (“Viet Cong”)—constituted third-state 
intervention in support of a government against a nonstate actor, 
placing the United States, the intervening state, in a non-
international armed conflict with the Viet Cong, the nonstate 
actor.141 Two conditions form the basis for this conclusion: first, 
the government of South Vietnam was engaged in a non-
international armed conflict with the Viet Cong; and second, the 
United States engaged in hostilities of sufficient intensity with the 
Viet Cong to constitute an armed conflict. The United States 
chose to treat the conflict as an international armed conflict as a 
matter of policy—an approach the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (“ICRC”) urged and supported—lending 
credence to the view that once the United States intervened, the 
whole conflict was internationalized.142 
 
one pro-Soviet leader of Afghanistan with another pro-Soviet leader of Afghanistan on 
the eve of its intervention; the initial invitation from the Afghan government may not 
have been in any sense lawful. Even before the intervention, Soviet troops were deployed 
in Afghanistan in support of the Afghan government, and the Soviet Union and 
Afghanistan had entered into a Treaty of Friendship just weeks before the intervention. 
See Tanca, supra note 130, at 176–77; see also Gasser, supra note 138, at 148–52. But see 
Michael Reisman & James Silk, Which Law Applies to the Afghan Conflict, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 
459, 466–74 (1988). 
141. Schindler, supra note 134, at 255–56. Some scholars, notably Meyrowitz, 
disagree with this mode of analysis for “mixed” armed conflicts. See Gasser, supra note 
138, at 147; James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International 
Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
313, 333–41 (2003). Instead, Meyrowitz applies the so-called global analysis of an armed 
conflict, urging that where third states intervene in a non-international armed conflict, 
the whole of the armed conflict is internationalized. See Henri Meyrowitz, The Law of War 
in the Vietnamese Conflict, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 516–33 
(Richard Falk ed., 1968). 
142. See Gasser, supra note 138, at 147. However, even though the ICRC in fact 
urged the internationalization view of the United States’ intervention in Vietnam in 
1965—and the United States and the government of South Vietnam adopted it—both 
the ICJ and the ICTY have implicitly endorsed the differentiation approach. Military and 
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US intervention in Nicaragua, however, resulted in parallel 
conflicts: one between the United States and Nicaragua and one 
between the contras and Nicaragua. In Nicaragua v. United States, 
the ICJ characterized the conflict between Nicaragua and the 
contras as a non-international armed conflict and determined 
that the United States’ support for the contras constituted US 
intervention into that non-international armed conflict, 
stating143: “The Court therefore finds that the support given by 
the United States . . . to the military and paramilitary activities of 
the contras in Nicaragua, by financial support, training, supply of 
weapons, intelligence and logistic support, constitutes a clear 
breach of the principle of non-intervention.”144 However, despite 
US intervention on behalf of the nonstate actor against a state in 
an ongoing non-international armed conflict, the court did not 
apply Common Article 2 to the contras. Instead, the court treated 
US intervention—particularly its mining of Nicaraguan ports—as 
a conflict distinct from the conflict between Nicaragua and the 
contras. 
2. US Intervention in Pakistan 
Analyzing the situation in Pakistan within this framework 
suggests that US engagement could constitute an intervention. As 
in both the Vietnam War and the Soviet War in Afghanistan, a 
non-international armed conflict between the government and a 
nonstate actor forms the backdrop for the foreign state’s 
involvement. The United States drone campaign is directed at 
the TTP, Pakistan’s foe in its non-international armed conflict. 
To the extent that US involvement rises to the level of armed 
conflict, it is an intervention into a non-international armed 
conflict in support of the territorial state and is therefore 
governed by Common Article 3 and the full range of IHL 
applicable in non-international armed conflict. 
Some scholars highlight statements by the Pakistani 
government opposing the US drone campaign and argue that 
 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 219 
(June 27); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 116 (ICTY May 7, 1997); 
see also Stewart, supra note 141, at 335. 
143. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 219 (finding the contras and the State of Nicaragua 
to be in an armed conflict not of an international character). 
144. Id. ¶ 242; see also id. ¶ 246 (“[T]he activities of the United States in relation to 
the activities of the contras in Nicaragua constitute prima facie acts of intervention.”). 
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Pakistan has not consented to the campaign.145 And yet it is not 
clear that the territorial state’s consent has any impact on the 
characterization of the armed conflict. Underlying the whole 
body of the law of armed conflict is a preference for fact-driven, 
objective analysis irrespective of technicalities. Thus, for example, 
the Soviet Union’s role in a coup d’etat at the outset of the Soviet 
intervention did not prevent the general view that the Soviets 
intervened on the Afghan government’s side in a non-
international armed conflict—even though it is hard to imagine 
the legitimate Afghan government consenting to an intervention 
concurrent with its ouster. Rather, most analyses highlight that 
the Soviet operations were directed not at the state but at 
nonstate actors.146 Here, the United States is similarly directing its 
drone strikes not at the state of Pakistan, Pakistani troop 
formations, military bases, or infrastructure, but at the TTP’s 
leadership, training camps, and militants. 
Moreover, in contrast to the public statements of the 
government of Pakistan,147 it appears that Pakistan has or at least 
may have consented to the US drone campaign. The US drones 
flying over Pakistan are launched from and maintained at bases 
within Pakistan.148 The government of Pakistan is reportedly not 
only involved in the targeting decisions for drone strikes—either 
by receiving notification prior to an impending strike or by 
actually nominating targets to be attacked by US drones149—but 
it has also reportedly bargained with the US government to allow 
expansion of drone strikes in exchange for a greater focus on the 
 
145. O’Connell, supra note 5, at 18; Lawful Use of Combat Drones: Hearing on the 
Legality of Unammned Targeting Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov. Reform, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame). O’Connell further argues that, 
even if Pakistan were to consent to drone strikes, those strikes prior to May 2009 would 
have been illicit because there was no armed conflict in Pakistan at least until then. Id. 
She does not clarify whether an armed conflict currently exists in Pakistan. 
146. Gasser, supra note 138, at 151–52. 
147. Scott Shane & Eric Schmitt, C.I.A. Deaths Prompt Surge in U.S. Drone Strikes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1. 
148. Id. 
149. Mayer, supra note 4, at 36 (“Last March [2009], the Obama Administration 
made an unannounced decision to win support for the drone program inside Pakistan 
by giving President Asif Ali Zardari more control over whom to target. ‘A lot of the 
targets are nominated by the Pakistanis—it’s part of the bargain of getting Pakistani 
cooperation,’ says Bruce Riedel, a former C.I.A. officer who has served as an adviser to 
the Obama Administration on Afghanistan and Pakistan.”). 
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TTP.150 Finally, the drone campaign appears to be coordinated 
with Pakistani offensives launched against the TTP: for example, 
at the request of the Pakistani government, drone strikes in 
South Waziristan all but ceased after Pakistan launched an 
offensive there on October 17, 2009.151 Drone strikes in North 
Waziristan, in contrast, have increased dramatically as members 
of the TTP have sought refuge there.152 
Combined, these factors point to US intervention in the 
ongoing non-international armed conflict between Pakistan and 
the TTP through its drone campaign targeting the TTP. As a 
result, rather than treat each drone strike as a separate discrete 
event or action in self-defense against an identifiable threat, the 
hostilities between the United States and the TTP constitute a 
non-international armed conflict. As such, Common Article 3 
and the customary international law applicable in non-
international armed conflicts govern. 
C. Two Separate Parallel Conflicts 
Alternatively, the conflict between the United States and the 
TTP could be a separate but parallel conflict. Many argue, for 
example, that the current US conflict with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and the US conflict with Al Qaeda are two such 
separate conflicts.153 Such a conflict could take a few different 
forms, in particular a non-international armed conflict under 
Common Article 3 or a so-called “transnational armed conflict.” 
 
150. James Kitfield, Wanted: Dead, NAT’L J., Jan. 9, 2010, 
http://nationaljournal.com/member/magazine/-wanted-dead--20100109?mrefid=site_
search. 
151. Shane & Schmitt, supra note 147; Katherine Tiedemann, Spotlight on North 
Waziristan, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar. 18, 2010, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/
2010/03/18/spotlight_on_north_waziristan. 
152. See Tiedemann, supra note 151. 
153. See, e.g., Corn, supra note 138, at 181, 190–211; Marco Sassòli, The Status of 
Persons Held in Guantanamo under International Humanitarian Law, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
96, 98–100 (2004); see also Lawrence Azubuike, Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda Soldiers: 
Another Viewpoint, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 127, 154 (2003) (disaggregating the United States’ 
conflict with the Taliban from its conflict with Al Qaeda but concluding that Al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan was so intertwined with the Taliban that its members ought to be afforded 
POW status); cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 219 (June 27) (treating the conflict between the contras and 
Nicaragua as a non-international armed conflict while characterizing any conflict 
between the United States and Nicaragua as an international armed conflict). 
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1. Common Article 3 Conflict 
In the aftermath of 9/11 and the US campaign against Al 
Qaeda, scholars and policymakers debated whether Common 
Article 3 applied to conflicts with nonstate actors occurring 
across borders or outside the territory of the state party. The 
argument centered, in many ways, on a textual interpretation of 
Common Article 3. Those taking a more limited view of 
Common Article 3’s scope argued that the words “non-
international armed conflict” encompassed only civil wars, or 
internal conflicts taking place entirely within the territory of a 
High Contracting Party.154 This interpretation was criticized, 
however, because it would leave conflicts between states and 
nonstate actors beyond their territorial boundaries outside the 
framework of the Geneva Conventions. 
Many instead chose to take a more expansive view of 
Common Article 3, arguing that it applies to all conflicts not 
covered by Common Article 2. After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, this is 
now the dominant interpretation—and the law of the land in the 
United States. In that case, the US Supreme Court endorsed a 
broad reading of Common Article 3 and rejected the notion that 
any form of armed conflict could remain unregulated by the 
Geneva Conventions. The Court declined to view Common 
Article 3 as a provision governing only internal armed conflict, 
instead holding that “[t]he term ‘conflict not of an international 
character’ is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between 
nations.”155 Because, under this view, all forms of armed conflict 
must fit into the Common Article 2-Common Article 3 
framework, any conflict not between two High Contracting 
 
154. See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to the President (Jan. 25, 2002) 
(Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict 
with al Qaeda an the Taliban) (“More importantly . . . [the war in Afghanistan] is a new 
type of warfare—one not contemplated in 1949 when [Geneva Convention III on the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War] was framed—and requires a new approach in our 
actions towards captured terrorists.”); see also UK MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE MANUAL OF 
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2004); John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United 
States Relating to International Human Rights and International Criminal Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 895, 897–98 (2005); Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of 
Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 295, 307 (2007) (“Nonetheless, during the five plus decades between 
1949 and 2001, the term ‘non-international’ evolved to become synonymous with 
internal.”). 
155. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006). 
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Parties is therefore a Common Article 3 conflict. The US conflict 
with the TTP fits squarely within this interpretation of Common 
Article 3. It is “non-international” because it does not meet the 
definition on international armed conflict in Common Article 2. 
Common Article 3 and the customary laws of war applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts thus apply to the conflict 
between the United States and the TTP. 
2. Transnational Armed Conflict 
Claims that the Common Article 2-Common Article 3 
framework does not apply to a cross-border armed conflict 
between a state and a nonstate entity in essence create a situation 
of “law avoidance.” In 1949, the drafters of the Geneva 
Conventions sought to eliminate an earlier type of law avoidance 
by substituting the objective term “armed conflict” for the more 
politicized—and easily manipulated—term “war.”156 “Whereas 
once countries denied jus in bello obligations by claiming that 
they were not engaged in ‘war,’ a term with specific legal 
connotations, the Geneva Conventions eliminated that particular 
circumlocution by creating a trigger for law applicability based 
on the existence of an armed conflict.”157 The US Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hamdan, as explained above, offered one way 
to put this law avoidance to rest.  
Another argument is that a cross-border conflict between a 
state and a nonstate actor constitutes, in essence, a form of 
armed conflict that could be termed “transnational armed 
conflict,” one governed by customary principles of the laws of 
war.158 The US conflict with the TTP—to the extent it is 
 
156. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 47, at 17–21. 
157. Laurie R. Blank, In Counterterrorism, the Law of War Is a Key Source of Law for the 
Courts, 32 ABA NAT’L SEC. L. REP. (forthcoming Winter 2010) (manuscript at 9–12); 
Geoffrey S. Corn, The Problem with Law Avoidance, 32 ABA NAT’L SEC. L. REP 
(forthcoming Winter 2010). 
158. Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric T. Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A “Principled” 
Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L. REV. 46, 65–66 
(2009); Geoffrey S. Corn, Multi-National Operations, Unity of Effort, and the Law of Armed 
Conflict 1, 3–11 (Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Working 
Paper), available at http://ihl.ihlresearch.org/_data/global/images/HPCR-WPS-Corn%
20Final.pdf; Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in 
Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004) (discussing the complex 
challenge of conflict categorization in military operations conducted against highly 
organized nonstate groups with transnational reach). 
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considered a separate conflict from the conflict between Pakistan 
and the TTP—certainly seems to fit within the concept of 
transnational armed conflict. Unlike the traditional conceptions 
of international armed conflict and non-international armed 
conflict, however, there is no treaty provision or other codified 
definition of transnational armed conflict. In the absence of such 
guidance, one way to categorize transnational armed conflict is to 
examine the nature of the state response to the nonstate actor 
specifically by assessing the nature of the authority to use force 
against that threat. By doing so, one can distinguish between 
situations of armed conflict—marked by the authority to use 
deadly force as a first resort—and law enforcement operations—
marked by carefully proscribed regulations on the use of force in 
self-defense only. Rules of engagement (“ROE”), which are the 
operationalization of the relevant law and the state’s broader 
strategic policy, offer a useful tool for analyzing this use of force 
authority. Thus, “a nation’s adoption of status-based rules of 
engagement for its military . . . should constitute the trigger 
requiring that nation and its military to apply the laws of war to 
that operation.”159 ROE that authorize the use of deadly force 
only in response to an individual’s conduct, on the other hand, 
do not authorize the use of deadly force as a first resort and do 
not import the law of armed conflict.160 
An airstrike directed against a terrorist training facility offers 
an example of status-based ROE: 
It is inconceivable that the authority to employ deadly force 
relied on by the air assets executing the mission [against the 
terrorist training facility] will be contingent on a provocation 
from the terrorist target. It is equally inconceivable that the 
air assets will be obliged to offer the potential targets the 
opportunity to submit to apprehension as a condition 
precedent to the employment of combat power. Instead, the 
authority to employ that power will almost certainly be based 
on an inherent invocation of the principle of military 
objective, allowing the use of deadly combat power based 
solely on the identification of the target as one falling into 
the category of a defined terrorist enemy.161 
 
159. Corn & Jensen, supra note 53, at 790. 
160. Corn, supra note 52, at 29. 
161. Id. at 30. 
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Applying this theory to US conduct and operations against 
the TTP in Pakistan suggests that the United States is indeed 
engaged in an armed conflict—a transnational armed conflict, it 
would appear—with the TTP and other targeted armed groups. 
US drone strikes employ lethal force as a first resort based solely 
on the target’s identification, not on any provocation or self-
defense. Targets are often identified based on their membership 
in or status within the TTP and other militant groups, not on the 
basis of conduct at any given time—although certainly many 
strikes are launched on the basis of specific intelligence 
regarding involvement in past, present, or future terrorist attacks. 
Nonetheless, the nature of US strikes and targeting 
determinations suggests that US actions are not law–enforcement 
actions, marked by strict regulations on the use of force, but 
rather military operations based on the law of armed conflict and 
the principle of military objective. Key principles of the laws of 
war, applicable in all conflicts as customary law and historic 
regulations on the conduct of military operations, apply to US 
operations against the TTP, regardless of whether the conflict 
can be characterized as a non-international armed conflict under 
Common Article 3.162 
CONCLUSION 
International humanitarian law provides a comprehensive 
framework for analyzing the existence and nature of conflicts 
between states, between states and nonstate actors, and among 
nonstate actors, whether within the territory of a single state or 
spreading across national borders. Over the past few years, 
however, as US drone strikes in Pakistan have increased steadily 
in frequency, regularity, and lethality, the general discourse has 
focused on the use of drones as a weapon for counter-terrorism, 
the lawfulness of acting in self-defense against nonstate armed 
groups, and other related questions. These issues are both 
interesting and highly important, but should not be the focus of 
analysis to the exclusion of the questions addressed here 
regarding the existence and characterization of the conflict. 
The extent and nature of the hostilities between the TTP 
and Pakistan demonstrate that there is currently a non-
 
162. Id. at 16–23. 
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international armed conflict in Pakistan, between the 
government and the TTP at least, and likely involving other 
armed groups as well. As detailed above, the intensity of the 
hostilities and the extent of the TTP’s organizational structure 
meet the thresholds set forth in existing jurisprudence on the 
existence of non-international armed conflict. Common Article 3 
and the principles of IHL recognized as customary law applicable 
in non-international armed conflicts therefore govern the 
conduct of Pakistan, the TTP, and other relevant armed groups. 
Furthermore, as the TTP continues to attack US targets and US 
drone strikes on TTP targets continue, the hostilities between the 
United States and the TTP have reached a steadily increasing 
level of intensity over the past two years. In 2009 and 2010, the 
intensity appeared to reach, if not easily surpass, the threshold 
for intensity as analyzed in the jurisprudence of the ICTY and 
other international tribunals. Once identified as an armed 
conflict rather than as isolated acts of violence, the hostilities 
between the United States and the TTP can be characterized as 
an intervention into the ongoing non-international armed 
conflict between Pakistan and the TTP. That conflict remains a 
non-international armed conflict because the United States is 
intervening on the side of the state actor. Alternatively, the 
conflict between the United States and the TTP can be 
characterized as a separate parallel conflict, either a Common 
Article 3 conflict, using the broad standard established in 
Hamdan, or, at a minimum, a transnational armed conflict 
triggering the application of fundamental principles of the law of 
war that govern the conduct of any military operations. 
